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Adoption of the medical model of psychopathology has de-emphasized the need for psychiatry to
incorporate new developments from the other social sciences. The need for an interpretive (rather than
merely biological) approach to psychopathology based upon theories of symbolic interaction is argued in
the present article with respect to the emerging field of cross-cultural psychiatry. Groundwork for such an
approach is sketched out by application of Obeyesekere's (1981) anthropological theory of personal
symbols.

Recent research into the connections between
neurochemical processes and psychopathology have led
to an expanded view of the brain's role in human
behavior and the development of pharmocological
treatment for mental disorder. Unfortunately, this
narrowed area of focus has led to a corresponding lack
of attention to developments in the social sciences,
namely new theories concerning the symbolic aspects
of human behavior. Such a lack of interest is
understandable given the basic premises on which the
medical model of psychopathology predicates itself.
The root core of the medical model is its view that
psychopathology stems from structural or
neurochemical impairments of the brain which inhibit
the diseased individual from meeting certain societal
standards of behavior. Yet, as the vast literature on the
medicalization of deviance has pointed out, this view
tends to localize the often systemic problem of deviant
behavior within disempowered individuals (see Conrad,
1980; Szasz, 1961). Moreover, though the etiology of
the disorder is assumed to be physical, the diagnosis of
a disorder is made on the basis of behavioral
observations and symbolic interaction through
language, both of which are culturally mediated. Thus,
the problem of making a diagnosis is compounded
when the diagnostician and therapist are from different
cultural backgrounds.
An empirical example will make this point clear.
Eisenbruch (1992) has argued that the DSM-Ill
diagnosis of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is
not applicable in his work with Cambodian refugees.
He claims:

The diagnosis is often based upon an ethnocentric
view of health that prescribes how refugees should
express their distress, how disorders should be
classified, and how the distress should be ameliorated.
It offers a checklist of criteria, many of which are
physical changes in the person's body that are easy to
elicit and presumed to occur as a universal
physiological reaction to stress, without regard to the
nature of the stressor or the individual's cultural
background. (p. 8)
Pointing to case studies and statistics on noncompliance with pharmacological treatments as
evidence of his point, he argues such diagnoses are
seldom helpful in treating individuals of different
cultural backgrounds. Rather, focusing on these
presumed universals obscures the contextual reasons for
the behavior. Eisenbruch substituted the term "cultural
bereavement" as a more accurate diagnosis for
Cambodian refugees normally diagnosed with PTSD. In
his formulation the individual's behavior results when
his/her link with the past and cultural categories of
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meaning has been violently torn away, leaving the
individual with no way in which to assimilate his/her
present condition with previous experience. This state
causes behavioral aberrations and somatic symptoms.
The Western diagnosis of PTSD and its ensuing
treatment, usually antidepressants or clonidine (Kinzie
& Leung, 1989), may actually harm the refugee by
further disassociating him/her from the native culture.
Eisenbruch points to the efficacy of traditional healers
and ritualistic treatments in reconnecting the individual
with his/her painful past and thus allowing continuity
of meaning and restored functioning in his/her
transplanted community.
Eisenbruch's (1992) article makes plain the need
for an interpretive approach to psychopathology which
assigns to culture a more comprehensive role than the
ephemeral position it holds in the current medical
paradigm. Such an approach must begin with an
examination into the role of culture in the symbolic
interaction between the individual and his/her culture. It
must then go to demonstrate the effect which the
symbolic idiom of a culture has upon the expression
and perception of psychopathology. Finally, an
interpretive approach should be applied not only to the
premises of cross-cultural psychiatry, but reflexively
applied to the expression and perception of
psychopathology in the Western world, including the
medical paradigm.
Personal Symbols and Myth Models of
Behavior

Gananath Obeyesekere's (1981) Medusa's Hair: An
Essay of Personal Symbols and Religious Experience,
an ethnographic study of ecstatic priestesses in Sri
Lanka, provides a theoretical approach to symbolic
interaction which can be used as the basis for an
interpretive approach to psychopathology. In its
theoretical orientation, the book is an attempt to bring
personality back into the scope of anthropological
studies by undermining the traditional dichotomy of
private and cultural symbols. To accomplish this goal
Obeyesekere uses Freud's psychoanalytic concepts to
model the explanatory model for reconnecting the
symbolism of the ecstatics with their interpersonal
situations. The psychoanalytic perspective is then
grafted upon a Weberian theory of culture to describe a
set of cognitive concepts which the individual uses to
assimilate and give meaning to the whole of
experience. He thus constructs a view of symbolic
interaction by which the individual and his/her culture
are brought together in a dialectic.
Obeyesekere's theoretical discussions are cast upon
the background of his field work with ecstatic

priestesses • at the Sinhala Buddhist festival of
Kataragama in Sri Lanka. He describes in great detail
the symbolic contents of the ecstatics' various visions
and somatizations. Specifically, he is interested in the
matted locks of hair empirically associated with
abstinence among the ecstatics. Drawing from Leach's
(1958) interpretation of matted locks in his essay
"Magical Hair," Obeyesekere notes the traditional
methodological separation of private and cultural
symbols. Private symbols, traditionally the domain of
psychoanalysis, are attributed to intrapsychic conflict
(deep motivation) which may give rise to somatic
manifestations or delusions. These delusions, though
they will certainly take their content from the
surrounding culture, are themselves devoid of cultural
meaning. Cultural symbols, on the other hand, are
viewed by most anthropologists as integral to group
communication and identification, yet are denied any
personal significance or deep motivation stemming
from the individual qua individual. Rather,
anthropologists have generally focused upon group
motivations and collective practices in their etiologies
of symbolic systems. Obeyesekere uses the problem of
matted hair to point out the danger of transporting
methodological assumptions across cultural boundaries.
The dichotomy of private/cultural symbols, he
demonstrates, is a product of Western intellectualism
and is not empirically supported in Sinhala culture.
Leach (1958), arguing against Berg's (1951)
psychoanalytic interpretation of matted locks for Hindi
holy men (the Sanyasin), draws evidence from the
Vedas that hair and sexuality are explicitly linked in the
culture and thus in the conscious minds of the ascetics.
To Leach the symbolic nature of matted hair is not
private but public, announcing to society that this
person has willingly renounced sex. Obeyesekere retorts
that both Berg's and Leach's analyses ignore the context
in which the symbol arises and persists. He
demonstrates his own theory of symbolic representation
through a comparison of matted locks for the Sanyasin
and shaved heads for Buddhist monks. He states that
• true symbols are always public in that their essential
nature is communication. By this, however, he does
not imply that symbols cannot be the manifestations of
deep motivation, but simply that manifestations which
do not reach the level of public recognition (and
sanction) do not belong to the category of symbols but
to symptoms and fantasies in the nature demonstrated
by Western psychotics. Thus symbols can never be
private—but they may be personal. By personal
symbols Obeyesekere understands a symbolic
representation which is drawn from the realm of public
mythology and animated by the deep motivation of the
individual. This definition has a profound effect upon
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the expression of psychopathology. For example, a
member of Buddhist culture who suffers from a
castration complex need not find recourse in typical
(Western) neurotic behavior because there is an
acceptable outlet for such anxiety within the culture
itself—Buddhist head-shaving. Anthropologists such as
Leach have ignored the personal context in which
symbols arise by denying that acts such as headshaving can manifest deep motivation because they are
cultural, an ignorance imposed by an ethnocentric bias
in methodology.
By stating that cultural symbols may be animated
by deep motivation, Obeyesekere does not by any
means align himself with the psychoanalytic
interpretation of symbols. Traditional psychoanalysis is
equally guilty for ignoring the socio-cultural context in
which symbols must persist if they are to be true
symbols rather than symptoms. Again there is a bias in
the methodology which here insists that every
manifestation of a symbol is derived from deep
motivation, that is, that every Buddhist monk that
shaves his head does so because of castration anxiety.
Obeyesekere provides a distinction between symbols
which are personal and those which are merely
psychogenetic. Psychogenetic symbols represent the
largest class of symbols which are in any way derived
from the unconscious, but which need not be derived
from the deep motivation of the particular individual
who participates in them. One must look at the context
in which participation occurs. For example, headshaving has become institutionalized with Buddhist
monkhood and is required for every monk. Yet the
motivation for monkhood may not always rest in
castration anxiety but in purely external circumstances,
as Obeyesekere demonstrates empirically through an
examination of recruitment practices. In such a case the
symbol exists on a level which is purely interpersonal,
articulating membership in the group—although its
original meaning may have once been symbolic
castration.
In order for a psychogenetic symbol to be personal
it must be recreated by the deep motivation of the
individual. In searching for personal symbols
anthropologists must always be attuned to cultural
ambiguity allowing individual choice to play a part in
manifestation. Head-shaving is an institutionalized
ritual for all monks, yet matted locks are not such a
requirement for the Sanyasin. This allows Obeyesekere
to claim that matted locks are primarily personal
symbols whereas shaved heads are primarily
psychogenetic (though they may be personal as well).
He gives the name objectification to the process by
which the deep motivation of the individual is recreated
within cultural, psychogenetic symbols. Obeyesekere
42

extends this line of thinking in his case histories of
ecstatics who are believed to be possessed by pretas, the
spirits of ancestors who act as mediators between
humans and the gods. The lack of formalization
associated with preta mythology allows this symbolic
idiom to be manipulated by the individual ecstatic.
Particularly, Obeyesekere emphasizes the role of
choice: choice of which dead ancestor the preta
represents and even for which god or goddess in the
pantheon the preta speaks. Objectification allows the
psychopathology of the sufferer to be expressed in a
way which is understandable and accepted by the
community.
Obeyesekere demonstrates that personal symbols
are a connection between the individual and society. In
his case histories he provides the interpersonal and
intrapsychic relations which he believes led to the
"psychotic" behavior of his informants. In this analysis
he uses Freud's concepts to Desiree the effect of the
interpersonal context upon the psyche of the individual.
However, there is one major point in which the
ecstatics differ from Freud's neurotics—the existence of
a symbolic idiom intelligible to both the individual and
society. The ecstatics not only manifest their deep
motivation in terms of visions expressed in symbolic
idiom, but are themselves acting out a symbolic mode
of behavior which conforms to certain cultural-mythical
roles. Obeyesekere calls these models of behavior
"myth models." The myth model is cultural and not
private in that it exists outside the individual as a mode
of discourse between the unconscious needs of the
individual and his/her social context. For example, in
one of the case studies a young female ecstatic is
possessed by the Black Prince (Kalu Kumara). The fact
that the adolescent is possessed by this particular
demon, Obeyesekere states, makes plain to all in the
community the sexual nature of her ailment and allows
the proper recourse (a quick marriage). The girls'
visions make meaningful a set of psychic phenomena
in the same way that cultural idiom is evoked to
provide meaning for physical phenomena, such as
natural' disasters. The myth model of the ecstatic
priestess allows the psychic turmoil of the individual to
be expressed in a way which, unlike the experience of
Freud's neurotics, reconnects the suffering individual to
society.
Subjective Imagery and the Etiology of
Symbolic Idiom

Obeyesekere's second theoretical project in the
book is to provide an etiological explanation for
psychogenetic symbols in cultural idioms. The above
discussion of objectification makes it apparent that
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Obeyesekere has already broken ranks with Durkheim's
(1915/1954) superorganic view in which culture acts
upon the passive individual in a manner which creates
normative behavior and modal personalities. Rather, the
symbolic idiom of culture provides the individual with
the cognitive tools to render natural and psychic
phenomena meaningful.
In this formulation the consciousness of the
individual is in constant dialogue with his/her culture, a
process which Obeyesekere demonstrates through the
creation of subjective imagery. Whereas objectification
represented the articulation of psychopathology in
terms of pre-existent forms, subjective imagery
involves the incorporation of ambiguous cultural
material into the creation of a subjective idiom (not
existent at the level of general culture) which is
nonetheless acceptable and articulate to the society.
This is possible because cultural forms are
underdetermined with respect to their-psychic origins, a
notion which Obeyesekere borrows from Weber's
definition of culture as "the finite segment of the
meaningless infinity of world-process, a segment on
which human beings confer meaning and significance"
(1946, p. 81).
Two points about the nature of culture as a
symbolic system are brought out in this definition.
First, Weber is clear in his designation of individual
consciousness as an active agent in the creation of
cultural meaning systems rather than a passive
recipient. Second, Weber indicates that since culture is
a finite segment within an infinite series it will always
involve an element of choice. Obeyesekere's
formulation of subjective imagery captures this notion
of culture and roughly corresponds to Weber's
discussions of charisma as the individual's ability to
affect culture (pp. 245-252). Cultural symbol systems
exist as a pathway to interpersonal and societal
discourse; yet culture, far from providing norms for
modal personalities, provides a means for accounting
for nonregular occurrences. If meaning for intrapsychic
stress cannot be found within the existent myth
models, the individual is empowered as a symbol
creator with the ability to recreate the cultural idiom to
articulate his/her own psychic needs.
If it is true that the creative power of subjective
imagery stems from the deep motivation of the
individual, it does not follow that he/she is free to
define symbolic meaning outside the realm of culture.
Indeed, given the Weberian perspective it would be
impossible to do so: the individual will always draw
upon cultural concepts in the creation of subjective
meaning. Subjective imagery is dependent upon sociocultural conditions for historical verification and
ultimate acceptance if it is to be symbolic and not

symptomak. In his discussion of savior myths, Weber
(1946, pp. 358-9) demonstrates that the emergence of
charismatic leaders in the role of messianic figures is
dependent upon a "theodicy of suffering" caused by
recurrent psychological need. While this theodicy does
not represent a cultural form in the mode of a myth
model to which the charismatic leader must fit, it does
condition a certain degree of receptivity towards some
forms over others. The essential difference between a
prophet and a psychotic is the degree to which the
culture embraces and incorporates the charismatic
figure. Weber (pp. 248-50) states that all charisma
must either become institutional or else die away. Thus
the etiology of culture proceeds by dialectic: if the
subjective imagery of the individual is embraced by
society it will become subsumed within the greater
symbolic idiom.
Obeyesekere demonstrates Weber's theory
empirically in his case histories and account of the
original ecstatics in the Sinhala festival at Kataragama.
He reports that when the ecstatic priestesses first began
to make their appearance at the Kataragama festival,
they claimed that they were possessed by the gods.
Prior to this no culturally sanctioned myth model for
such behavior existed, and the priests in charge of the
festival refused to accept that the gods would inhabit
the impure body of a woman. The ecstatics were forced
to accept a compromised interpretation that their
visions were actually the effect of preta possession but
that the pretas acted as merely intermediaries for the
gods. This compromise, which over time has become
culturally and institutionally accepted, does not
represent a 'pigeonholing' of subjective experience
within a pre-existent myth model. Rather, the ecstatics
were able to gain cultural acceptance by transforming
the myth model of preta possession to legitimize the
claim that they spoke the words of the gods.
Institutionalization and the Demythologizing of Symbolic Idiom

Note that to this point the discussion has focused
on the attributes of symbolic systems and the
interaction between culture and the individual visions of
the ecstatics. Little attention has been paid to the
ecstatics themselves. Obeyesekere, due to his Freudian
perspective, considers the visions of the ecstatics to be
pathological in that they are the manifestations of
intrapsychic turmoil. As Johannes (1984) points out in
her review of the book, the author's discussion of case
studies leaves the reader with the impression that
dissociative states are inherently pathological. Yet this
in itself is not sufficient for labeling these women
mentally "ill" in the sense implied by Western
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nosologies. As many in the literature have pointed out
(Szasz, 1961; Foucault, 1974; see also Fabrega, 1976;
Sedgwick, 1982; Wakefield, 1992), mental "illness" is
a cultural classification with a specific history in
Western medicine that carries with it a number of
assumptions that are difficult to apply cross-culturally.
The designation of mental "illness" can best be
described in terms of symbolic systems. This
perspective introduces the concept of cultural relativism
into the universalistic medical paradigm. Even if it is
assumed, for the moment, that the Sinhala ecstatic and
the Western psychotic are equally pathological, it is
still the case that the course of their pathology will be
very different. The pathology of the ecstatic is
expressed in a symbolic idiom which allows discourse
of personal needs with the society and facilitates the
reintegration of the individual into the community. The
label of mental "illness," on the other hand, continually
marginalizes rather than reintegrates the - Western
psychotic. In Obeyesekere's scheme this consequence
lies not in the pathology of the individual but in the
inability of a demythologized symbolic code to
integrate the subjective imagery of the individual.
Rather than transforming the cultural idiom, the
Western psychotic is forcefully pigeonholed into ever
more comprehensive "myth models" of Western
psychiatric taxonomies. While these "myth models" do
allow society to attribute some degree of
comprehensibility to the psychotic's actions, they do
not meet the needs of the psychotics themselves,
whether intrapsychic or interpersonal. To follow
Obeyesekere's line of thinking, the Western secular
world has so demythologized its symbolic code that it
is no longer capable of manifesting the deep motivation
of individuals. Denied access to cultural myth models
and verification of their own subjective imagery, the
afflicted individual is forced to act out the
manifestations of their turmoil in private symptomsymbols.
Obeyesekere does not himself reconstruct the
process by which Western symbolic idiom has reached
this demythologized point, but his discussion of
personal symbols and subjective imagery give several
hints to the process which are relevant to an
interpretive approach to psychopathology. The
instrument by which institutionalization takes place is
the introduction of rational discipline designed to
impose predictability on charisma's incalculable nature
(Weber, 1946). The definitive effect is the reduction of
choice available to the deep motivation of the
individual. Thus preta possession, once the subjective
image of a few pioneering ecstatics, becomes a myth
model with certain rules to which aspirants must
comply. One of these rules includes the psychic
44

disposition to go into trance states. Obeyesekere
describes the pathetic plight of one young woman who
lacked this basic qualification and was forced to act out
her distress in less culturally recognized ways. As
mythologies become more and more rigid and
standardized in their formulation, there is less and less
choice allowed in the personal recreation of the symbol.
What was once a primarily personal symbol becomes
primarily psychogenetic, as in the case of Buddhist
head-shaving. This progression can be seen in Western
history in the creation of the scientific method through
the continual rationalization of folk and mythological
explanations of natural phenomena. In Obeyesekere's
account of Kataragama, institutionalization occurs more
in the realm of artistic and mythic representation than
in the strict sense of Western rationalization, but the
effect is the same: as they are subjected to conscious
scrutinization, symbols lose their ambiguity and thus
their ability to articulate to society the deep
motivational needs of the individual.
Conclusions

Cultural symbolic systems, as both Weber (1946)
and Obeyesekere point out, serve as explanatory
categories rendering acts of nature meaningful even
when the psychogenetic symbols themselves have
ceased to carry deep motivation. This is essentially the
state of Western secular thought. Scientific categories
have become extremely demythologized with the
introduction of rational methodology, yet they remain
symbolic systems nonetheless. This fact is often
obscured by a logical flaw by which the explanatory
structures of scientific theory are placed in an
antecedent, causal position (Dewey, 1925). In Dewey's
formulation of scientific empiricism, explanatory
structures are abstracted from experience in order to
provide a greater level of understanding and control over
nature. However, it is a logical fallacy to then place
these structures in a position metaphysically anterior to
experience. Both psychoanalysis and the biomedical
model .of psychiatry display this fallacy when they
assume that psychological phenomena are generated by
underlying forms which are applicable cross-culturally.
In this medical model an individual's culture merely
provides the surface content of psychopathology. It is
assumed that pathological states are causally determined
in the same way that physical events are determined.
However, an appeal to mechanistic views of human
behavior, whether biological or psychoanalytic, tends
to obscure the contextual factors influencing behavior
and de-emphasize the role of human agency (Szasz,
1961). In a recent paper on spirit possession in South
Asia, Castillo (1994) concludes that biomedical
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psychiatry and psychoanalysis are both inadequate for
understanding the phenomenology of trance states
because the experiential level at which we encounter
these states is caught up in culturally constituted
categories of thought. What is needed to understand
such diverse cultural phenomena is a theoretical
framework which restores integrity to indigenous
modes of explanation consistent with the cognitive
categories of the individual.
Obeyesekere's formulation of symbolic systems,
despite its use of psychoanalytic modes of explanation,
provides the theoretical support for an interpretive view
of psychopathology and a valuable heuristic model for
combating the inherent universalism of Western
science. His case studies are a vivid reminder that,
regardless of their etiological histories, the behavioral
disturbances by which mental "illnesses" are identified
are culturally mediated. Moreover, his interpretation of
Weber secures the position of the- individual as an
active agent in cultural theory. The tendency of recent
psychiatric taxonomies such as the DSM-IV to portray
pathological categories as discreet entities existing in
culture-free nature is a prime example of Dewey's
positivist fallacy and a dangerous trend to cross-cultural
psychiatry (Eisenbruch, 1992; Littlewood 1991; see
also Fabrega, 1976, 1987, 1994; Kirmayer, 1991). As
long as it is assumed that by stripping away the
cultural "clothing" of pathological behavior the
diagnostician can arrive at the etiological core of the
disease, cross-cultural psychiatry will betray its
ethnocentrism as an attempt to impose Western,
demythologized categories of thought upon indigenous
behaviors. For this reason it is necessary that
psychiatry move beyond its positivist bias toward the
development of a more comprehensive theory of
psychopathology based upon a general theory of
behavior which includes both culture and symbolic
behavior.
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